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Information Leakage as a Model for Quality 
of Anonymity Networks 
Ye Zhu, Member, IEEE Computer Society, and Riccardo Bettati, Member, IEEE Computer Society 
Abstract—Measures for anonymity in systems must be, on one hand, simple and concise and, on the other hand, reflect the realities of 
real systems. Such systems are heterogeneous, as are the ways they are used, the deployed anonymity measures, and finally, the 
possible attack methods. Implementation quality and topologies of the anonymity measures must be considered as well. We therefore 
propose a new measure for the anonymity degree that takes into account these various aspects of design and operation of anonymity 
systems. We model the effectiveness of single mixes or of mix networks in terms of information leakage, and we measure it in terms of 
covert-channel capacity. The relationship between the anonymity degree and information leakage is described, and an example is shown. 
Index Terms—Anonymity, covert channel, information leakage. 
Ç 
1 INTRODUCTION 
OVER the recent years, we have experienced an increased In order to determine the participants in a communica­perceived need for various forms of privacy-preserving tion, the attacker cannot simply inspect the packet or the 
communication settings, be it for pseudonymous publishing, packet header, since this information is hidden through 
service hiding, or anonymous communication in general. encryption and rerouting. More sophisticated typically 
Many high-level privacy-preserving systems such as electro­ traffic-analysis-based techniques are required. Given the 
nic cash, anonymous publishing, and others require a layer importance of effective privacy-preserving communication 
that provides some form of anonymity-preserving commu­ systems, the question of how to quantify the anonymity 
nication service in order to protect the identity of the provided by an anonymity system is of great relevance. 
participants. Anonymous communication can be provided 
Researchers proposed various definitions to quantify 
in a number of forms: sender anonymity protects the identity of 
anonymity, such as anonymity set size [5], effective anonymity 
the sender, while receiver anonymity protects that of the 
set size [6], and entropy-based anonymity degree [7], all of receiver. Another form is sender-receiver anonymity (also 
which measure the number of possible receivers or senders called unlinkability), which hides whether a given sender is 
of a message. While these metrics led to an increasinglycommunicating with a given receiver. Based on these very 
better understanding of anonymity, they tend to focus on simple measures, more sophisticated privacy-preserving 
schemes can be built. A large number of systems to support the anonymity of a single message under a single anonymity 
such privacy-preserving communication have been pro- attack. In practice, however, metrics that take into account 
posed. Most common such systems rely on so-called mix the realities of today’s use of networks are needed: 
networks, which perturb the traffic in the network in order to communication settings in real systems range from single 
hide the participants in a communication. The traffic is messages to message groups, voice-over-IP streams, and 
typically perturbed 1) in the payload domain, through FTP transfers. In addition, sophisticated attacks can resort to 
encryption, 2) in the routing domain, through rerouting, a variety of techniques to break anonymity: flow correlation 
and 3) in the timing domain, by randomly delaying packets attacks [8], intersection attacks [9], trickle attacks [10], and 
and by generating additional dummy traffic. The objective is so on. A number of out-of-the-box attacks have been 
to prevent an observer from identifying the participants of a described to attack anonymity systems as well, such as 
conversation. Examples include Crowds [1] for anonymous Murdoch’s clock-skew attack to locate hidden services [11]. 
Web transactions, Freenet [2] for distributed anonymous A measure for the anonymity degree should satisfy a 
information storage and retrieval, Tarzan [3] for P2P 
number of requirements: First, the anonymity degree 
networking, and—most prominently—Tor for anonymous 
should capture the quality of an anonymity system. It has 
communication generally and for service hiding [4]. 
been shown, for example, that information-theoretical 
means such as entropy are more accurate for comparing 
anonymity systems than, say, anonymity sets. Second, the 
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University, College Station, TX 77843-3112. E-mail: bettati@cs.tamu.edu. information an attacker can gather and thus has an impact 
on the system anonymity degree. For example, a system of 
fully connected nodes will provide a different level of 
anonymity from a chain of nodes. Third, the anonymity 
degree, as a measure of the effectiveness of the anonymity 
system, should be independent of the number of users for 
two reasons: 1) while a large number of users clearly 
contributes to anonymity, this does not necessarily reflect 
on the quality of the anonymity system, and 2) the 
effectiveness of “hiding in a crowd” is not well understood. 
For example, we have shown in [12] that crowds can be 
partitioned through appropriate preconditioning of obser­
vation data, e.g., by using Blind Source Separation. 
Next, the anonymity measure must be independent of 
the threat model, as attackers may use a variety of attack 
techniques or combinations thereof to break the anonymity. 
Finally, the anonymity degree should support the 
engineering of anonymity networks. As such, it should 
allow for composition of networks out of single mixes and 
subnetworks with well understood anonymity degrees into 
larger networks whose anonymity degree is well under­
stood as well. 
Since the goal of anonymity attacks is to infer the 
communication relations in a system despite counter­
measures, it is natural to model such attacks as covert 
channels, and interest has focused on the interdependence 
of anonymity and covert channels [13]. The designer of an 
anonymity system generally faces the question of how 
much information may leak from the anonymity network 
given the unavoidable imperfectness of the latter and how 
this may affect the anonymity degree. This information 
leakage can be evaluated in form of a covert channel. 
The major contributions of our study are summarized as 
follows: First, we propose an anonymity degree to quantify 
the anonymity provided by an anonymity network. This 
definition generalizes the information-theoretic definitions 
previously proposed in [6] and [7]. Then, we propose a new 
class of covert channels, which we call anonymity-based 
covert channels. We formally prove how to establish covert 
channels of maximum capacity over a single mix based on 
anonymity attacks on the mix. Finally, we use anonymity-
based covert channels to assess the performance of mix 
networks. We show how the capacity of anonymity-based 
covert channels can be used to provide simple composable 
descriptions of nonperfect mix networks and can be used to 
formulate bounds on the provided anonymity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
reviews the related work. Section 3 describes the proposed 
anonymity degree and the relationship with other entropy-
based anonymity degree definitions. In Section 4, we define 
the anonymity-based covert channel. Sections 5, 6, and 7 
present the relationship between the covert-channel capa­
city and anonymity degree for a single-mix case and mix-
network case. Section 8 illustrates the results in the previous 
sections by evaluating and comparing different design 
decisions for a mix network. We conclude this paper and 
discuss the future work in Section 9. 
2 RELATED WORK 
A large number of systems for anonymous communication 
have been proposed and developed over the last few decades, 
both for latency-tolerant and low-latency communication. 
Chaum [14] pioneered the idea of anonymity in 1981. Since 
then, researchers have applied the idea to different applica­
tions such as message-based e-mail and flow-based low-
latency communications, and they have invented new 
defense techniques as more attacks have been proposed. 
For anonymous e-mail applications, Chaum proposed to use 
relay servers, called mixes, that reroute messages. Messages 
are encrypted to prevent their tracking by simple payload 
inspection. 
Helsingius [15] implemented the first Internet anon­
ymous remailer, which is a single application proxy and 
replaces the original e-mail’s source address with the 
remailer’s address. Gu¨ lcu¨ and Tsudik [16] developed a 
relatively complete anonymous e-mail system, called Babel. 
Cottrell [17] developed Mixmaster, which counters a global 
passive attack by using message padding. It counters trickle 
and flood attacks [16], [10] by using a pool batching strategy. 
Danezis et al. [18] developed Mixminion. Mixminion’s 
design considers a large set of attacks that researchers have 
found [19], [10]. The authors suggest a list of research topics 
for future study. Tor [4], the second-generation onion router, 
has been developed for circuit-based low-latency anon­
ymous communication recently. It can provide perfect 
forward secrecy. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of such anonymity systems 
under anonymity attacks, a number of different anonymity 
degree definitions have been proposed. The anonymity 
degree proposed in [1] is defined as the probability of not 
being identified by the attacker. It focuses on each user 
separately and does not capture the anonymity of the whole 
system. Berthold et al. [19] propose an anonymity degree 
based on the number of the users of an anonymity system. 
There is an ongoing debate about what is the role of the 
number of users in providing anonymity. Intuitively, the 
larger the crowd, the easier it is for an individual to hide in 
it. In practice, however, attacks proceed by isolating users 
or groups of users that are more likely to be participants in a 
communication. This was first considered in the anonymity 
set, introduced in [20]. The anonymity set describes the set 
of suspected senders or receivers of a message. The size of 
the anonymity set is used in [5] as the anonymity degree. 
A big step forward was done by Serjantov and Danezis [6] 
and by Diaz et al. [7] by proposing anonymity measures that 
consider probability distributions in the anonymity set. Both 
measures are based on entropy and can differentiate two 
anonymity sets that have identical sizes but different 
distributions. The measure in [7] normalizes the anonymity 
degree to discount for the anonymity set size. 
A number of efforts have studied the relation between 
covert channels and anonymity systems. Moskowitz et al. [21] 
focus on the covert channel over a mix-firewall between two 
enclaves. The covert channel in this case is established by the 
channel receiver determining whether an anonymized 
sender is transmitting packets. Newman et al. [22] focus on 
the covert channel over a timed mix. The authors in [13] make 
a series of excellent observations about the relation between 
covert channels and anonymity systems. They illustrate this 
relation by describing the linkage between the lack of 
complete anonymity (quasianonymity) and the covert com­
munication over different types of mixes. Finally, they 
propose to use this covert-channel capacity as a metric for 
anonymity. 
The work presented in this paper takes a system-level view 
of covert channels and anonymity and differs from previous 
work such as [13], [21], and [22] in two ways. First, we assume 
Fig. 1. Model of a mix. 
that the existence of various sources of information leakage in 
the elements (mixes, batchers, padders, . . . ) of an anonymity 
system are a reality that system designers and operators have 
to deal with. Some of the resulting covert channels can be 
identified and either measured or analyzed using the 
techniques described in [21] and [22]. Statistical techniques 
can be used as well, as we describe in Section 3. In addition, 
any cautious anonymity system designer or operator must 
assume that mixes presumed to be perfect are not so, even if 
the particular weakness is not known a priori. In this paper, 
we use covert-channel capacity as a generic measure to model 
weaknesses (known or unknown) in the anonymity system 
infrastructure. This gives a tool for designers or operators to 
uniformly describe both known weaknesses (i.e., results of 
attacks) or merely suspected ones and to analyze their effect 
on the anonymity provided by the system. Second, the 
anonymity degree of the mix network is a result of system-
level effects: changes in the user population or application mix 
affect the anonymity provided and so do topology of the 
anonymity system and routing preferences within the system. 
As a result, there is no one-to-one mapping from the 
anonymity degree to covert-channel capacities of elements 
in a mix network and vice versa. In this paper, we investigate 
the relationship between anonymity degree and covert-
channel capacity in terms of what effect one has on the other. 
3 ANONYMITY DEGREE 
A number of attacks have been described recently that give 
rise to moderately high-capacity channels on mixes. Several 
attacks to simple mixes lend themselves to an accurate 
analysis of the exploited covert channels, such as in [13], 
[21], and [22]. For other attacks, the covert-channel capacity 
can be merely estimated, using statistical means. Examples 
are intersection attacks [9], timing attacks [23], Danezis’s 
attack on the continuous mixes [24], and the flow correla­
tion attack [8]. The timing attack [23] uses cross-correlation 
to match flows given the packet time stamps of the flow. 
Danezis’s attack on the continuous mix [24] uses likelihood 
ratios to detect a flow in aggregate traffic. The flow 
correlation attack [8] employs statistical methods to detect 
TCP flows in aggregate traffic. The flow correlation attack 
can achieve high detection rates for all the mixes described 
in [10] and for continuous mixes. 
3.1 Attack Model 
We model a single mix (Fig. 1) as a communication node that 
connects m senders S ¼ ðs1; s2; s3; . . . ; smÞ to n receivers 
R ¼ ðr1; r2; r3; . . . ; rnÞ. Every sender si may communicate to 
every receiver rj. We say that a communication exists between 
si and rj whenever si communicates to rj. A communication 
between si and rj is denoted by the term ½si; rj]. It can consist 
of either a single packet being sent or of an established flow. 
We model an attack to such a node in terms of its 
effectiveness in determining who is talking to whom: the set 
of probabilities pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ denotes the probabilitys a 
that communication ½su; rv] is suspected, given that com­s 
munication ½si; rj] is actually taking place. In other words, a a 
probability pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ denotes the probability of s a 
erroneously suspecting su sending to rv when in actuality 
si is sending to rj. This model lends itself to accurate 
descriptions of many different attacks, as the probability 
pð½·; ·] j½·; ·] Þ can be defined based on the observation of s a 
single packets, a number of packets, a flow, or a session, 
depending on the particular attack method used. 
For example, the passive attack described in [25] 
successfully determines a flow when the flow is alone on 
a link. Therefore, the probability pð½si; rj] j½si; rj] Þ of s a 
correctly identifying communication ½si; rj] is equal to the 
chance that the flow is alone on the output link from the mix 
to receiver rj. Alternatively, for Danezis’s attack on the 
continuous mix [24], the probability pð½si; rj] j½si; rj] Þ is the s a 
probability that the likelihood of the hypothesis assuming 
that the flow of interest is going through the link between 
the mix and receiver rj is greater than any other hypothesis, 
assuming that the flow of interest is going to any other 
receiver. Finally, for the flow correlation attack [8], the 
probability of pð½si; rj] j½si; rj] Þ is equal to the probability s a 
that the mutual information between the flow of interest 
and the aggregate traffic on the link between the mix and 
receiver rj is larger than the mutual information between 
the flow of interest and the aggregate traffic on any other 
outgoing link. 
We note that the attacker may use different attack 
methods to estimate the probability pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ for s a 
different communications on different mixes or even on the 
same mix. In addition, a priori information that the attacker 
may gather about potential participants can be included as 
well. For example, the presence of dummy traffic may 
indicate the existence of some anonymized traffic. Similarly, 
some active participants are known to have communicated 
in the past, which may reflect on their a priori probability 
that they are communicating in the present. 
The model above describes attacks on sender-receiver 
anonymity, where both the sender and the receiver are 
anonymous. It can be easily extended to sender anonymity 
or receiver anonymity, that is, cases where the sender only 
or the receiver only is anonymous, respectively. For 
example, we can describe the results of a sender-anonymity 
attack in terms of pð½su; *] j½si; *] Þ or just pð½su] j½si] Þ. To  s a s a 
keep the following discussion simple and general, we will 
focus on sender-receiver anonymity, with the understand­
ing that sender anonymity or receiver anonymity can be 
modeled just as well. 
3.2 Proposed Anonymity Degree 
We define a new measure D for the anonymity degree 
based on the following rationale: Let the random variable 
½S;R] indicate the actual sender and receiver pair and the a 
random variable ½S;R] in turn indicate the suspected sender s 
and receiver pair. If the attack identifies the communicating 
pairs with high accuracy, then the dependence between the 
two random variables ½S;R] and ½S;R] will be high. a s 
In general, the dependence of two random variables can 
be measured using the mutual information of the two 
random variables. The mutual information IðX; Y Þ of two 
random variables X and Y is a function of the entropies of 
X and Y as follows: 
IðX; Y Þ ¼  HðXÞ -HðXjY Þ: ð1Þ 
Therefore, the effectiveness of an attack can be described 
in terms of the mutual information Ið½S; R] ; ½S; R] Þ. a s 
To give a more figurative interpretation of mutual 
information as a measure of the attack effectiveness, we 
use an analogy to communication channels: mutual infor­
mation is typically used to describe the amount of 
information sent across a channel from a sender X to a 
receiver Y , where HðXÞ is the information at the input of the 
channel, and HðXjY Þ describes the information attenuation 
caused by the noise on the channel. (See [26] for an easy-to­
read introduction to the information theory used in this 
context.) This gives an intuition of why mutual information 
describes the effectiveness of an anonymity attack. Let 
½S; R] be the random variable that describes the actual a 
sender and receiver pair. Let an attacker’s estimate of ½S; R]a 
through observation of the system be ½S; R] . The informa­s 
tion carried through the observation channel provided by an 
attack is therefore Ið½S; R] ; ðS; R] Þ. The higher this carried a s 
information, the more accurate the anonymity attack.1 Using 
the textbook definition for entropy, the effectiveness of an 
anonymity attack can be described as follows: ( ) ( ) ( )
I ½S; R] ; ½S; R] ¼H ½S; R] -H ½S; R] j½S; R]a s a a s ( )X ( ) p ½s; r] j½s; r]s	 a¼ p ½s; r] ; ½s; r] log ( ) : a	 s p ½s; r]½s;r] ;½s;r]	 s a s 
ð2Þ 
In (2), we let pð½s; r] ; ½s; r] Þ ¼  pð½s; r] Þpð½s; r] j½s; r] Þ and a s a s a 
pð½s; r]s Þ ¼  ½s;r] pð½s; r]a; ½s; r]s Þ. We let pð½s; r]a Þ denote the 
P 
a 
a priori probability of s communicating to r, typically 
derived from the expected traffic from s to r. 
We can now formulate the anonymity degree D as a 
function of the attack effectiveness as follows: ( )
I ½S; R] ; ½S; R]a sD ¼ 1 -	 : ð3Þ 
logðm · nÞ 
Since Ið½S; R] ; ½S; R] Þ � Hð½S; R] Þ � logðm · nÞ, we use a s a 
logðm · nÞ to normalize the anonymity degree into the range 
of [0, 1] in (3). Alternatively, one could choose Hð½S; R] Þ as a 
the normalization factor. However, the latter depends on the 
a priori probability of communication between each pair of 
sender and receiver. The impact of this a priori probability 
has been taken into account by the term pð½s; r] Þ in (2). a 
The equality Ið½S; R] ; ½S; R] Þ ¼  Hð½S; R] Þ holds when a s a 
perfect identification of the sender-receiver pair is achieved, 
that is, pð½si; rj] j½si; rj] Þ ¼  1 for each pair of sender and s a 
receiver. This corresponds to the situation where anonymity 
is totally broken, in which case the anonymity degree 
measure D is zero. 
1. Strictly speaking, we measure the upper bound over all anonymity 
attacks. If an attack is biased and consistently makes wrong decisions, some 
other attack may make consistently better decisions. 
Fig. 2. Single-mix scenario. 
On the other hand, the anonymity degree D is one 
whenever no information about sender-receiver relation­
ships can be gathered in addition to a priori information: in 
this case, Ið½S; R] ; ½S; R] Þ ¼  0. a s 
3.3	 Relationship to Previous Anonymity Degree 
Definitions 
The anonymity degree definition D is a generalization of the 
entropy-based definitions proposed in [6] and [7]. In fact, 
we can rewrite the attack effectiveness Ið½S; R] ; ½S; R] Þ as a s ( ) ( ) ( )
I ½S; R] ; ½S; R] ¼H ½S; R] -H ½S; R] j½S; R]a s s s a ( )¼H	 ½S; R]s X	( ) ( )-	 p ½s; r] H ½S; R] j½S; R] ¼½s; r] : a s a a 
½s;r]a 
ð4Þ 
In (4), the term Hð½S; R] j½S; R] ¼ ½s; r] Þ represents the s a a 
conditional entropy of the suspected sender-receiver pair 
distribution given the communication ½s; r]. This corre­
sponds to the anonymity degree definition described in [6] 
and also to the core of the anonymity degree defined in [7]. 
In our mutual-information-based anonymity degree, the 
entropy-based degree is included by averaging according to 
pð½s; r] Þ, the a priori probability of traffic between each pair. a 
In comparison to the entropy-based definitions above, our 
proposed definition describes the anonymity provided by a 
network of mixes. 
4 ANONYMITY-BASED COVERT CHANNELS 
Less-than-perfect anonymity systems give rise to a form of 
covert channel that is exploited by anonymity attacks. We 
call this form of covert channel an anonymity-based covert 
channel. The input symbols of this type of covert channel 
are the actual sender-receiver pairs ½s; r] , and the channel a
output symbols are the suspected sender-receiver pairs ½s; r] . s 
The channel transition probability pð½s; r] j½s; r] Þ (i.e., the s	 a 
probability that ½s; r] is suspected as communication given s 
that ½s; r] is the actual communication) describes the result a 
of the anonymity attack. 
We use the simple scenario shown in Fig. 2 as an 
example. We assume that the attacker can collect data at the 
output  ports of the  mix as well as some additional  
information about incoming traffic from the senders. The 
details on how this information is collected and evaluated 
depend on the particular attack. (We described a few 
examples in Section 3.1.) Given sufficient collected data, the 
attacker can detect individual communications such as 
� �
� �
� �
� �
Fig. 3. Anonymity-based covert-channel model. 
½s2; r2] with some non-negligible probability, despite the 
anonymity-preserving countermeasures in the mix. 
The fact that the attacker is able to gain information 
about communications indicates that a covert channel of the 
following form exists: A covert-channel sender can send a 
symbol by establishing a communication from some sender 
s2 to receiver r1 and send another symbol by establishing a 
communication from sender s2 to another receiver r2. The 
covert-channel receiver can use the anonymity attack to 
detect the flow’s direction and then make the decision. The 
channel model is as shown in Fig. 3. For the sake of 
simplicity, in this example, we limit the covert-channel 
sender to establishing communications from sender s2. 
Allowing communications from sender s1 increases the set 
of input symbols accordingly. 
We compute the capacity of the (anonymity-based) 
covert channel in a textbook fashion by maximizing the 
mutual information over all input symbol distributions: ( )
C ¼ max I ½s2; R] ; ½s2; R]a s 
pð½s2;r] Þa  2 2  
¼ max p ½s2; ri] ; ½s2; rj]

XX ( )
a s ð5Þ 
pð½s2;r] Þ i¼1 j¼1a ( )  
p ½s2; rj] ; ½s2; ri]a s · log ( ) ( ) : 
p ½s2; ri] p ½s2; rj]a s 
While the previously defined anonymity degree D only 
incidentally has an information-theoretic definition, the 
similarity between the anonymity degree D and the 
capacity of the anonymity-based covert channel is not 
accidental: The anonymity degree D describes the “ex­
pected” information leakage through an anonymity net­
work, whereas the anonymity-based covert channel 
describes the leakage that is maximally achievable by 
carefully controlling the communication patterns through 
the network. The channel capacity C therefore describes a 
low bound on the “quality” of the anonymity network. We 
will describe in the following how to derive the provided 
anonymity degree D from a bound on C and what “quality” 
levels are needed to reach a predefined anonymity level D. 
The covert channels previously proposed in the context 
of mix networks [13], [21], [22] are not anonymity based in 
the sense described above, as the signal is not received 
across the channel as a result of an anonymity attack. 
Rather, they describe information leakage in low-level 
mechanisms that are used to realize mixes, such as the 
batching mechanisms in [13] and [21]. These covert channels 
are then exploited by the anonymity attacks, which in turn 
can be used to establish the type of anonymity-based covert 
channels described in this paper. 
5 SINGLE-MIX CASE 
In a mix with a single sender s1, a covert-channel sender can 
establish a covert channel by having s1 communicate with 
any combination of j among the n receivers. For this covert 
channel, the set of input symbols is f½s1; rk] : 1  k ng,a 
and the set of output symbols is f½su; rv] : 1  u m;s 
1 v ng. We can include all communications into the set 
of output symbols because the improbability of any 
particular communication being declared as suspected by 
a particular attack can be appropriately reflected by a zero 
transition probability. ( )Pn nTherefore, different covert channels can bej¼1 j
established. Similarly, if the covert-channel sender has 
cont rol o ve r mult i ple se n de rs, there ar e a t l east P ( )P ( )m m n n different covert channels that can bei¼1 i j¼1 j P ( )P ( )m m n nestablished. Which of these coverti¼1 i j¼1 j
channels has the maximum capacity? 
Lemma 1. For a single sender si on a single mix, the maximum 
covert-channel capacity is achieved when si can communicate 
to all receivers. 
Proof. By having si communicate to all receivers, the covert-
channel sender can send all the possible symbols ½si; rj] ,a
1 j n. We call this covert channel x. By definition, the 
capacity of channel x is the maximal mutual information 
over the distributions pð½si; r1] Þ, pð½si; r2] Þ; · · ·  ; pð½si; rn] Þ,a a a Pnwhere j¼1 pð½si; rj] Þ ¼  1, that is a ( )
Cx ¼ max I ½S;R] ; ½S;R] : ð6Þ a s 
pð½si;r1 ] Þ;pð½si;r2 ] Þ;a a 
···;pð½si ;rn ]aÞ 
The range of the max operator in (6) (and the value 
for Cx) is clearly maximized when si can communicate to 
all receivers, and therefore, none of the pð½si; rj] Þ is zero. a 
Hence, the capacity of channel x communicating to all 
receivers is larger or equal to the capacity of all other 
covert channels that communicate to only a subset of 
receivers. tu 
Theorem 1. For a single mix, the maximum covert-channel 
capacity is achieved when the covert-channel sender controls 
all the senders s1; s2; . . .  ; sm and the input symbols of the 
corresponding channel include all the possible pairs ½si; rj] . a 
The proof of Theorem 1 follows the same approach as the 
proof of Lemma 1. 
From Theorem 1, we can derive the following corollary: 
Corollary 1. For the single-mix model shown in Fig. 1, the 
maximum covert-channel capacity is 
C ¼ max Ið½S;R] ; ½S;R] Þ: a s 
pð½s;r] Þa
From Corollary 1 and (3), we derive the relationship 
between the quality of a single mix (i.e., the capacity of any 
covert channel that allows information to leak from the mix) 
and its anonymity degree. (Note that this relationship is 
trivial for the single-mix case. However, we make use of this 
result in the analysis of networks of mixes.) 
Lemma 2. Given a single mix with a potential maximum 
information leakage that is upper bounded by Cupper, the 
anonymity degree of the single mix is lower bounded by 
Cupper1 - . Similarly, given that the anonymity degree log ðm·nÞ 
provided by a single mix is upper bounded by Dupper, the 
maximum information leakage of the mix is lower bounded by 
ð1 -DupperÞ log ðm · nÞ. 
Proof. If the covert-channel capacity is upper bounded 
by Cupper ( )
I ½S; R] ; ½S; R]a sD ¼ 1 -
logðm · nÞ 
C > 1 -
logðm · nÞ 
Cupper> 1 - : 
logðm · nÞ 
If the anonymity degree is upper-bounded by Dupper, ( ( ))
C ¼max I ½S; R] ; ½S; R]a s ( )> I ½S; R] ; ½S; R]a s 
¼ð1 -DÞ logðm · nÞ 
> ð1 -DupperÞ logðm · nÞ: 
ut 
Lemma 2 describes how the design and implementation 
quality of a mix affects effectiveness. In the following 
sections, we will describe this relation for the case of mix 
networks. 
6 MIX-NETWORK CASE 
6.1 Anonymity Degree of a Mix Network 
We generalize the anonymity degree for a single mix defined 
in (3) to the network case by observing that the effectiveness 
of a mix network can be represented similarly to that of a 
“supermix.” Let RM and SM represent the set of senders and 
receivers of the supermix, respectively. The anonymity 
degree of the supermix (and of the mix network) is ( )
I ½SM;RM ] ; ½SM;RM ]a sD ¼ 1 - ; ð7Þ 
logðm · nÞ 
where similar to the single-mix case 
I ½SM;RM ] ; ½SM;RM ]a s
( 
( 
) 
) p(½su(; rv] j½si; r) j] )
! X 
s a¼ p ½si; rj] ; ½su; rv] · log : a s p ½su; rv]½si;rj] ;½su;rv] s a s 
ð8Þ 
Ið½SM;RM ] ; ½SM;RM ] Þ is determined by pð½si; rj] Þ and a s a 
pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ, where probability pð½si; rj] Þ is the pro­s a a 
portion of traffic between si and rj, and the probability 
pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ is determined by the results of the s a 
anonymity attack at one or more mixes in the mix network. 
In the following sections, we describe how to make use of 
the single-mix attack result to describe the effectiveness of a 
mix network. 
6.2 Effectiveness of Single Mix versus Supermix 
In the following, we use the term phð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ to s a 
represent the transition probabilities that are the result of 
some anonymity attack on mix Mh and pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ to s a 
represent the end-to-end transition probability for the super-
mix. Without loss of generality, we assume in the following 
that the supermix transition probability we are interested in is 
pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ. The process to determine the relationship s a 
between phð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ and pð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ can be s a s a 
divided into three steps. 
Step 1. Find the set Puv of all the possible paths between 
su and rv. Clearly, ( ) X ( )
p ½su; rv]sj½si; rj]a ¼ p ½su; rv]s;Pa j½si; rj]a ; ð9Þ 
Pa2Puv 
where pð½su; rv]s;Pa j½si; rj]a Þ denotes the probability of sus­
pecting communication ½si; rj] to be communication ½su; rv]a s 
over path Pa. Note that the actual communication between si 
and rj takes only one path, which we call path P0. 
Step 2. Determine the probability of suspecting an actual 
communication over path P0 to be the communication over 
another path Pa. Depending on how path Pa and path P0 
overlap, we distinguish three situations: 1) there is only one 
segment where the two paths overlap, 2) the two paths 
share multiple segments, and 3) there is no overlap between 
the two paths. Since there is no overlap in situation 3, the 
probability of suspecting a communication over path P0 to 
be the communication over path Pa is zero. Hence, we only 
need to further pursue situations 1 and 2. 
Situation 1 can be divided into four subcases. 
Case 1. P0 and Pa are identical. This implies that su ¼ si 
and rv ¼ rj. In this case, the probability of suspecting 
correctly is the product of the probabilities of locally 
suspecting correctly at all mixes along path P0. If we denote 
the mixes on path P0 to be M1;M2; . . .  ;Ml, then ( ) ( )
p ½si; rj]s;P0 j½si; rj] ¼ p1 ½si;M2]sj½si;M2]a ! 
l-1 Y ( ) ð10Þ· pd ½Md-1;Mdþ1] j½Md-1;Mdþ1]s a 
d¼2 ( )· pl ½Ml-1; rj] j½Ml-1; rj] : s a 
This follows directly from the fact that correct guesses at 
each mix on the path cause the attacker to correctly suspect 
the actual path. 
Case 2. P0 and Pa share the same path from si through 
the first mix M1 to some mix Ml and then diverge due to an 
error at mix Ml. This is illustrated in Fig. 4, where in order 
to emphasize the path P0 and Pa, other possible connections 
among the mixes and other possible mixes are ignored. The 
fact that P0 and Pa share the same path from si means that si 
is correctly suspected, i.e., su ¼ si. 
In this subcase, the probability of erroneously suspecting 
some receiver rv other than rj is the result of correctly 
identifying the path up to some mix Ml-1 and then making 
a mistake at mix Ml. Once an error has been made, the 
remaining mixes on the path to any erroneously suspected 
Fig. 4. Case 2. 
receiver rv are not on path P0. According to the attack 
model described in Section 3, no differentiation can be 
made between rv and any other receiver that can be reached 
after making an error at mix Ml. We therefore aggregate all 
receivers that can be reached after an error at mix Ml into 
ijwhat we call a cloud of receivers. We denote by C thel=q 
cloud that is a result of an error at mix Ml, where  
communication ½si; rj] is incorrectly identified because a 
port q was erroneously selected instead of the port taken 
by ½si; rj] . For the example in Fig. 4, the probability of a 
ijsuspecting a receiver to be inside cloud C isl=q (h i ) ( )ijp si; C j½si; rj] ¼ p1 ½si;M2] j½si;M2]l=q s a s  ! 
l-1 Y ( )· pd ½Md-1;Mdþ1] j½Md-1;Mdþ1] ð11Þ s a 
d¼2 (h i )
ij· pl Ml-1; C j½Ml-1; rj] :l=q a s
Since we are only interested in receivers in the cloud, we call 
ijC a receiver cloud in this case. Whenever the contextl=q 
requires, we distinguish between sender clouds and 
receiver clouds, denoted SC and RC, respectively. We 
aggregate receivers into clouds because without additional 
evidence about the actual flow, it is impossible to 
differentiate suspects in a cloud by assigning different 
probabilities. More sophisticated anonymity attacks may 
make it possible to better differentiate receivers and senders 
in local attacks on mixes. In such a case, we would modify 
our detector model and extend (11) accordingly. In some 
cases, a cloud can consist of a single receiver or sender. 
The dashed line between mix Ml and receiver rj in Fig. 4 
is to emphasize that the existence of intermediate mixes 
after Ml will not further contribute to suspecting commu­
ijnication ½si; rj] as communication ½si; C ] . a l=q s 
Case 3. P0 and Pa share the same path from some 
mix Ml to the receiver. Similar to Case 2, we introduce a 
ijsender cloud C , which is connected to the (input) port q ofl=q 
mix Ml. Since the anonymity attacks from mix M1 to mix 
Ml-1 may make a wrong decision to suspect communica­
tion ½si; rj] as communications from senders attached to a 
mixes M1 to Ml-1, the probability of suspecting commu­
nication ½si; rj] as communications from senders attached a 
to the mixes after Ml-1 will be p1ð½si;M2] j½si;M2] Þ ·  s a Ql-1ð d¼2 pdð½Md-1; Mdþ1] j½Md-1;Mdþ1] ÞÞ. T he n , a w ro ng s a 
guess at mix Ml and correct guesses till the end of path 
ijwill result in the suspected communication ½SC ; rj] . For l=q s 
Fig. 5. Case 3. 
the situation in Fig. 5, the probability of suspecting 
ijcommunication ½C ; rj] isl=q s (h i ) ( )ijp C ; rj j½si; rj] ¼ p1 ½si;M2] j½si;M2]l=q s a s  ! 
l-1 Y ( )· pd ½Md-1;Mdþ1] j½Md-1;Mdþ1]s a 
d¼2 (h i )
ij ð12Þ· pl C ;Mlþ1 j½Ml-1;Mlþ1]l=q a s  ! 
L-1 Y ( )· pd ½Md-1;Mdþ1] j½Md-1;Mdþ1]s a 
d¼lþ1 ( )· pL ½ML-1; rj] j½ML-1; rj] : s a 
Case 4. P0 and Pa only share their path in middle of each 
path, as shown in Fig. 6. 
In this case, we combine Cases 2 and 3 as follows: (h i ) ( )ij ijp SC ;RC j½si; rj] ¼ p1 ½si;M2] j½si;M2]l=p L=q s a s ! 
l-1 Y ( )· pd ½Md-1;Mdþ1] j½Md-1;Mdþ1]s a 
d¼2 (h i )
ij· pl SC ;Mlþ1 j½Ml-1;Mlþ1] ð13Þl=p a s ! 
L-1 Y ( )· pd ½Md-1;Mdþ1] j½Md-1;Mdþ1]s a 
d¼lþ1 (h i )
ij· pL ML-1; RC j½ML-1; rj] :L=q a s
We point out that Cases 1, 2, and 3 can all be regarded as 
special cases of Case 4. In Case 1, both sender cloud and 
receiver clouds have only one sender and one receiver, 
respectively. In Case 2, the sender cloud has only one sender, 
while in Case 3, the receiver cloud has only one receiver. 
Situation 2 can have two or more overlaps between 
path P0 and Pa. However, the attacker loses the ability to 
Fig. 6. Case 4. 
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infer anything about communication ½si; rj] after the first a 
mistake, where the two paths split. All the nodes reachable 
after the first mistake have to be aggregated in a receiver 
cloud. This situation is therefore no different than the 
single-overlap situation described above. 
The result of Step 2 is the probability pð½SCij ; RCij ] jl=p L=q s ½si; rj]Þ of suspecting communication ½si; rj] as communica­a 
ij ijtion ½SC ;RC ] .l=p L=q s 
Step 3. In Steps 1 and 2, we determined path-
dependent end-to-end transition probabilities of the form 
ij ijpð½SC ;RC ] j½si; rj] Þ from the local transition prob­l=p L=q s a 
abilities at the mixes. This allows us to determine the 
end-to-end transition probabilities of the supermix (and 
—as a side result—the anonymity degree of the mix 
network) by solving the following optimization problem: 
Given 
.	 local transition probabilities phð½·] j½·] Þ at each s a 
mix Mh in the network, 
.	 path-dependent transition probabilities pð½SCij ;l=pijRC ] j½si; rj] Þ, and L=q s a 
.	 traffic volume in form of a priori probability 
pð½si; rj] Þ. a 
Objective function. Minimize the anonymity degree D 
in (3). This is equivalent to maximizing the mutual 
information Ið½S; R] ; ½S; R] Þ in (2). a s 
Constraints. The optimization problem is subject to the 
following three sets of constraints: 
[Constraint set 1]. The sum of all path-independent 
transition probabilities to all the end nodes in a group of 
clouds is identical to the sum of path-dependent end-to-end 
transition probabilities to the clouds in the group. For 
simplicity of notation, we formulate this for the special case 
of a correctly suspected sender si. The extension to the 
general case is cumbersome, but straightforward. Let GRi;j v 
be the smallest set of receiver clouds that contain rv and all 
receivers in GRi;j: v X ( )8rv : p ½si; rw] j½si; rj]s a 
i;j rw v 2GRX h i	 ð14Þ 
i;j¼ p si; RC j½si; rj] :l=q as;Pbi;j	 i;jRC	 2GRvl=q 
[Constraint set 2]. The sum of all path-independent 
transition probabilities to a subgroup of receivers is larger 
than the sum of the path-dependent end-to-end transition 
probabilities to clouds that only contain the receivers in the 
subgroup. This is true because one receiver in the subgroup 
may be contained in another cloud that contains the 
receivers not in the subgroup. Let Rsub be a subset of the 
i;jset R of all receivers. Define H to be the set of all clouds Rsub 
that contain only receivers in Rsub. For the simple case of a 
correctly suspected sender si X ( )8Rsub : p ½si; rv] j½si; rj]s a 
rv2Rsub X (	 ) ð15Þ > p ½si; RCi;j j½si; rj] :l=q]s;Pb a 
i;j	 i;jRC	 2H 
l=q Rsub 
[Constraint set 3]. The sum of all path-independent 
transition probabilities to a subgroup of receivers is less 
Fig. 7. A small example. 
than the sum of the path-dependent end-to-end transition 
probabilities to those clouds that have at least one 
receiver in the subgroup. This holds because these clouds 
may have other receivers that are not in the subgroup. 
Let Rsub be a subset of the set R of all receivers. Define 
i;jI	 to be the set of all clouds that contains at least one ofRsub 
the receivers in Rsub. We can conclude that X ( )8Rsub : p ½si; rv] j½si; rj]s a 
rv2Rsub X (	 ) ð16Þi;jp ½si; RCl=q]s;Pb j½si; rj]a : 
i;j i;jRC	 2I 
l=q Rsub 
[Constraint set 4]. The end-to-end transition probabilities 
for all suspects for all actual communications sum up to 1: X ( )8i; j p ½su; rv] j½si; rj] ¼ 1: ð17Þ s a 
su;rv 
The solution of this optimization problem is the set of the 
end-to-end transition probabilities of the supermix that 
minimize the anonymity degree of the mix network. 
6.3 A Small Example 
We use the example mix network displayed in Fig. 7 to 
illustrate how to compute end-to-end transition probabil­
ities as described in Step 2 of Section 6.2. 
We focus on communication ½s1; r1]. Suppose the actual 
communication takes the route P0 : s1 ! M1 ! M3 ! 
M5 ! r1. In this case, the probability of (erroneously) 
suspecting communications ½s1; r3] is computed as follows: ( ) ( )
p ½s1; r3] j½s1; r1] ¼ p1 ½s1;M3] j½s1;M3]s a s a (	 ) ð18Þ · p3	 ½M1; r3] j½M1;M3] : s a 
This computation is simple, since there is only one path 
from s1 to r3. 
The situation of (correctly) suspecting communication 
½s1; r1] is more complicated, because two paths can be a 
taken. One is P0 : s1 ! M1 ! M3 ! M5 ! r1, and the other 
is P1 : s1 ! M1 ! M4 ! M5 ! r1. Clearly, we have ( ) ( )
p ½s1; r1]s;P0 j½s1; r1] ¼ p1 ½s1;M3]sj½s1;M3]a (	 ) ð19Þ· p3 (½M1;M5] j½M1;M5])s a · p5	 ½M3; r1] j½M3;M1]s a 
of suspecting ½s1; r1] over path P0. 
For path P1, we cannot get expression pð½s1; r1]s;P1 j½s1; r1] Þ a 
directly in terms of anonymity attack result at mixes, because 
the wrong guess at mix M1 will possibly lead to two receivers 
r1 and r2. Therefore, we have to aggregate receivers r1 and r2 
in receiver cloud C1;1 , where q denotes the wrongly selected 1=q
output port at mix M1. Therefore, what we can get is (h i ) ( )
p s1; C
1;1 j½s1; r1] ¼ p1 ½s1;M4] j½s1;M1] ; ð20Þ1=q a s a s
where the erroneous selection of port q on mix M1 leads to the 
suspected path s1 ! M1 ! M4. Clearly, both receiver r1 and 
receiver r2 can be reached after selecting port q on mix M1. 
In turn, by following (14), we can get ( ) ( )
p ½s1; r1] j½s1; r1] þ p ½s1; r2] j½s1; r1]s a s a ( ) ( )¼ p1 ½s1;M4] j½s1;M1] þ p1 ½s1;M3] j½s1;M3]s a s a 
· p3 (
(½M1;M5] j½M1;M5])
)	 ð21Þ 
s a 
· p5 ½M3; r1] j½M3;M1] : s a 
After repeating this for all possible sender-receiver pairs, 
expressions for the end-to-end transition can be formulated, 
and the optimization described in Step 3 of Section 6.2 can 
be used to determine the anonymity degree of the network. 
7 COVERT-CHANNEL CAPACITY VERSUS 
ANONYMITY DEGREE IN MIX NETWORKS 
The analysis of the effectiveness of anonymity networks is 
rendered difficult for two reasons primarily: First, attacks on 
such networks are typically out-of-the-box attacks (for 
example, none of the intersection attacks, trickle attacks, or 
others target measures taken by the mix network). Second, it 
is unknown where and how traffic information is collected. Is 
the attack targeting individual mixes or clusters of mixes? Is 
the information collected on a per-mix or a per-link basis? 
In this section, we describe how the anonymity in mix 
networks can be systematically analyzed and bounded 
based on estimates of either per-mix weakness (using local 
covert channels) or the entire mix network (using network-
wide covert channels). For this purpose, we investigate the 
relation between the covert-channel capacity of a mix 
network and the anonymity provided by the network. 
7.1	 Upper Bound on the Covert-Channel Capacity in 
Mix Networks 
Let the mix network have K mixes. For Mix Mh, we use Sh 
and Rh to represent the set of senders and receivers of 
mix Mh, respectively. Any anonymity attack on mix Mh will 
lead to a set of probabilities of the form phð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ s a 
with su and si in Sh and rv and rj in Rh. 
In a mix network, there are various ways to establish covert 
channels. For example, in the mix network shown in Fig. 8, 
there are at least two ways to establish the covert channels 
using the two mixes MA and MB. One way is to establish one 
covert channel on MA and MB separately. Alternatively, one 
can establish a covert channel on the supermix containing 
both MA and MB. We assume each mix can only be contained 
in one covert channel as before. In the following, we use the 
notation ccðMÞ to denote the covert channel that can be 
established over the set of the mixes M. If we denote the 
capacities of ccðfMAgÞ and ccðfMBgÞ to be CA and CB, 
respectively, then the sum of the covert-channel capacity 
clearly is CA þ CB. We have the following lemma. 
Lemma 3. The capacity of ccðfMA;MBgÞ will be no greater than 
CA þ CB. 
Fig. 8. Mix network of two mixes. 
Proof. The input and output alphabet of ccðfMAgÞ are 
f½s; r] :s 2 SA; r  2 RAg, where SA¼fs1; s2; · · ·  ; s ;MBg,a	 mA
and RA ¼ fr1; r2; · · ·  ; r ;MBg. Please note that mix MBnA
can be both a sender and a receiver for mix MA and vice 
versa. We can construct a new channel v1 from 
ccðfMAgÞ with reduced set of input symbols. The input 
symbols of channel v1 are f½s; r] : s 2 SA - fMBg;a 
r 2 RAg f½MB;MB] g. According to Theorem 1, the 
S 
a
capacity of ccðfMAgÞ will be no less than the capacity of 
channel v1. 
Now, we consider the following covert channel v2. 
The covert-channel sender of v2 controls all the senders 
s 2 SA - fMBg attached to mix MA to communicate with S 
any receiver r attached to both mixes, r 2 RA RB -
0fMA;MBg, where RB¼fr1; r0 2; . . .  ; r0 ;MAg. Let I2 denote nB S 
the set f½s; r] : s2SA-fMBg; r2RA RB-fMA;MBgg. a 
Assuming the covert-channel sender can also send the 
symbol ½MB;MB] , t he input symbols o f v2 are S a
I2 f½MB;MB] g. The receiver of the covert channel v2a
can only observe all the links connected to mix MA. 
Therefore, the channel output symbols are f½s; r] :s2SA;s 
r 2 RAg. The transition probability for channel v2 is fully 
determined by the anonymity attack on mix MA. For 
example, for input symbol ½s1; r1] and output symbol a 
½s1; r1] , the transition probability is pMAð½s1; r1] j½s1; r1] Þ. s	 s a 
Please note that ( ) ( h i )[	 J0	 0 p ½s1; rx] j s1; r ¼ p ½s1; rx] j s1; rs i a s j a ð22Þ ( )¼ pMA ½s1; rx] j½s1;MB] ;s a 
where rx 2 RA, r0 i 2 RB, and r0 j 2 RB. 
We can observe that because of (22), we can get channel 
v1 by aggregating channel v2’s input symbols ½sx; r0 ] ;1 a
½sx; r0 ] ; . . .  ; ½sx; r0 ] ðsx 2 SA - fMBgÞ into ½sx;MB] . It  is  2 a nB a	 a 
obvious that 
nB ( )X [ J ( )0 p sx; r ¼ p ½sx;MB] : ð23Þi a a 
i¼1 
The mutual information IðX; Y Þ is a concave function of 
pðxÞ for fixed pðyjxÞ. From Jensen’s inequality [27], we can 
infer that the mutual information between channel v1’s 
input and output will be no less than the mutual 
information between channel v2’s input and output. 
Therefore, the capacity of channel v1, denoted as C , is  v1 
no less than the capacity of channel v2, denoted as C .v2 
Furthermore, we can extend the output symbols of 
channel v2. The extension is described as follows: 1) extend 
��
 
½sx;MB] to  ½sx; r0 ] ; ½sx; r0 ] ; . . .  ; ½sx; r0 ] , 2  ) e  x  t  e  n  d  s 1 a 2 a nB a0 0 0½MB; ry] to ½s1; ry] ; ½s2; ry] ; . . .  ; ½s ; ry] , and 3) extend s s s mB s½MB;MB] to f½s; r] : s 2 SB - fMAg; r  2RB - fMAgg. s 
We can construct channel v3 as follows: Its input 
symbols are the output symbols of channel v2, and its 
output symbols are the extended output symbols of 
channel v2. Clearly, the transition probabilities of 
channel v3 are determined by the anonymity attack on 
mix MB. Thus, channel v3’s output is determined by 
channel v3’s input, and it is independent of channel v2’s 
input given channel v3’s input. Therefore, we have the 
Markov Chain: channel v2’s input ! channel v2’s output, 
i.e., channel v3’s input ! channel v3’s output. 
According to the data processing inequality [27], the 
mutual information between channel v2’s input and 
channel v2’s output will be no less than the mutual 
information between channel v2’s input and channel v3’s 
output. We can create a channel v4 whose input is 
channel v2’s input and whose output is channel v3’s 
output. By construction, the capacity C of channel v4v4 
will be no greater than C , the capacity of the channel v2.v2 
So far, we have 
CA > C > C > C ð24Þv1 v2 v4 
and ( )
C ¼ max I ½si; rj] ; ½su; r ] ; ð25Þv4 P va s 
pð½si;rj] Þ¼1 a  
½si;rj ] 2I2 aS 
f½MB;MB ]g S S 
where su2SA SB-fMA;MBg, rv2RA RB-fMA;MBg, 
0and SB ¼ fs1; s0 2; . . .  ; s0 ;MAg.mB
Clearly, the output symbols of channel v4 are the same 
as the output symbols of channel ccðfMA;MBgÞ, which is 
built on the supermix. The input symbols of channel v4 
contain a part of the input symbols of channels 
ccðfMA;MBgÞ and ½MB;MB] . a 
Similarly, we can get ( )
CB > max I ½si; rj] ; ½su; rv] ; ð26Þ P a s 
pð½si;rj] Þ¼1a  
½si ;rj ] 2I0
 a 2 S 
f½MA;MA ]g S 
where I 0 ¼f½s; r] : s2SB -MA; r  2 RA RB-fMA;MBgg,2 a 
0and SB ¼ fs1; s2 0 ; · · ·  ; s0 ;MAg. The other part of the mB
input symbols ccðfMA;MBgÞ is included in I2 0 . 
The capacity of channel ccðfMA;MBgÞ is ( )
Cs ¼ P max I ½si; rj] ; ½su; rv]a s 
pð½sl;rj] Þ¼1a 
½sl ;rj ] 2
aS 
I0I2 2 ( ) ð27Þ 
max I ½si; rj] ; ½su; rv]P a s 
pð½si;rj] Þ¼1 a S 
½si ;rj ] 2I2a 
f½MB;MB ] g
a
( )0þ P max I ½si; rj]a; ½su; rv] ð28Þ s 0pð½s ;rj] Þ¼1i a S 
½s0 ;rj ] 2I0 i a 2  
f½MA;MA ] g
a
CA þ CB: ð29Þ 
The inequality between (27) and (28) holds because of two 
reasons: First, the maximization range comprising of P P S S 
½si;rj] 2I2 f½MB;MB]g pð½si; rj]a Þ¼1 and ½s0 ;rj] 2I 0 f½MA;MA]ga i a 2 0pð½si; rj] Þ ¼  1 includes  the  maximiz  ation  r  ange  a P S 
½sl;rj] 2I2 I 0 pð½sl; rj]a Þ ¼  1. Second, according to the log a 2 
sum inequality [27], 
X ( )
p ½MB;MB] ; ½si; rj]a s  
½si;rj] 2O2 s ( )
p ½MB;MB] ; ½si; rj] ð30Þ a s · log ! ( )
p ½MB;MB] Þpð½si; rj]a s 
X ( )> pð½MB;MB] ; ½si; rj]a s 
½si;rj] 2O2s P ( )
p ½MB;MB] ; ½si; rj]a s ð31Þ 
½si;rj] 2O2 · log P s ( )
p ½MB;MB] Þpð½si; rj]a s 
½si;rj] 2O2s
¼ 0; ð32Þ 
where O2 is the set of output symbols of channels v4 
and ccðfMA;MBgÞ. Adding nonnegative terms will not 
change the direction of the inequality. From (28) to (29), 
inequalities (24) and (26) and (25) are used. tu 
By extending the two-mix case in Lemma 3, we obtain 
the following lemma: 
Lemma 4. For two mixes connected with more than one link, the 
capacity of the covert channel built on the supermix 
ccðfMA;MBgÞ will be no greater than CA þ CB. 
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3. Instead of only one 
path between MA and MB, there are several such paths. 
This will not affect the validity of the inequalities employed 
in the proof of Lemma 3. 
Theorem 2. In a mix network of K mixes, the sum of the 
capacities of all the covert channels in the mix network will be PKno greater than Ch.h¼1 
Proof. This theorem can be proved by induction on K mixes 
with the help of Lemma 4, as any set of K þ 1 mixes can be 
partitioned into a supermix of Kmixes and a single mix.tu 
7.2 Relationship 
Similar to the single-mix case in Section 5, we are 
interested in how bounds on the achievable anonymity 
degree are affected by the covert-channel capacity of the 
system and vice versa. For example, it is obvious that an 
upper bound on the anonymity degree will result in a 
lower bound on the total covert-channel capacity, follow­
ing the observation that anonymity attacks are more 
effective in less anonymous mixes. 
The upper bound Dupper on the anonymity gives rise to a 
lower bound Clower on the sum of the local channel capacities: ! 
K X 
Clower ¼ min Ch : ð33Þ 
n¼1 
TABLE 1  
Path of the Actual Communications  
Fig. 9. An example mix network. 
Equation (33) gives rise to a minimization problem over 
anonymity attack results phð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ, with the fol­s a 
lowing three constrains. First, the local a priori probabilities 
for communications at each mix Mh must sum to one: 
mh nh XX ( )
ph ½si; rj] ¼ 1: ð34Þ a 
i¼1 j¼1 
Second, the transition probability from each input symbol 
½si; rj] of each mix should sum up to one: a 
mh nh XX ( )
ph ½su; rv] j½si; rj] ¼ 1: ð35Þ s a 
u¼1 v¼1 
Third, the anonymity of the system, as computed in 
Section 6.1, should not exceed Dupper. 
We can solve this constrained optimization problem 
analytically by using Lagrange multipliers and Kuhn-
Tucker conditions or by using numerical methods such as 
Monte Carlo. 
Similarly, given upper bound Cupper on the total covert-
channel capacity of the mix network, we would like to find 
out a lower bound Dlower for the anonymity degree of the 
mix network. 
The objective function becomes  ( ) 
I ½SM ; RM ] ; ½SM ; RM ]a sDlower ¼ min 1 - : ð36Þ 
logðm · nÞ
This optimization problem is over all possible anonymity 
attack results phð½su; rv] j½si; rj] Þ. Constraints (34) and (35) s a 
still hold in this case. The new constraint is 
K 
Cupper > Ch: ð37Þ 
h¼1 
X 
8 EVALUATION 
We use the mix network shown in Fig. 9 as an example to 
illustrate the relationships established in the previous 
section. We choose six mixes because it is a nontrivial 
topology, and both a mix cascade and a stratified network 
[28] can be established on the six mixes. 
We assume that communications between each sender-
receiver pair have the same a priori probability (alterna­
tively, the same share of total traffic volume). Since there are 
two senders and two receivers, we have four sender-
receiver pairs. The actual path for communication ½si; rj] is a 
shown in Table 1 if the actual path is not specified and the 
path is possible in the topology. For our examples, we use 
adaptive simulated annealing to solve the optimization 
problem to establish Dlower from a known bound on the mix 
network capacity. 
The following measurements focus on the impact of 
parameters of the anonymity network. Parameters that are 
extraneous to the network proper (for example, the number 
of concurrent users) are not measured. 
Impact of the connectivity. Obviously, the connectivity 
will affect the anonymity degree in a mix network. In our 
first set of examples, the base topology contains only the 
solid lines in Fig. 9. Then, edges are incrementally added to 
the base topology in the order of the label assigned to each 
edge. The average degrees of the topologies, including the 
16base topology, are 2, 14 6 , , 3, and 
20 , respectively. 6 6 
For every mix in the base topology, there is only one 
input link and one output link. Therefore, there is only one 
sender receiver pair for the mix in the base topology. A 
channel with only one input symbol and one output symbol 
has capacity zero. Therefore, the capacity Csum is zero for 
the base topology. 
In Fig. 10a, we first observe that the lower bound of the 
anonymity degree decreases with increasing bound on the 
capacity, just as expected. In addition, the capacity Csum 
increases with increasing connectivity. For a given upper 
bound of the capacity Csum, increasing connectivity will 
increase the anonymity degree. Third, we can observe that 
there is large gap between the base topology and the 
topology of the next higher average degree. This is because 
adding the edge of label 1 will connect s1 and r2, and 
communication ½s1; r2] can be suspected as ½s1; r1] . There-a s 
fore, the initial edge added to the topology can increase the 
anonymity degree significantly. In comparison, the effect of 
adding an edge with label 4 is marginal. 
Effect of adding different edges. In the second set of 
examples, we use the solid lines and edge with label 1 as the 
base topology. Then, we add one more edge, with label 2, 3, 
or 4, to the base topology. We label the new topologies as A, 
B, and C, respectively. Clearly, these topologies are of 
the same average degree. In Fig. 10b, we observe that the 
anonymity degree increase caused by the addition of the 
edge with label 3 is smaller than that for the other two 
edges. This is because adding the other two edges can make 
communication ½s2; r1] possible, and communication a 
½s2; r1] can be suspected as some other communication. a 
Effect of path selection. In this set of examples, we focus 
on the topology containing all the solid and dashed lines 
except the edge with label 3. We consider two cases. In one 
case, the actual path for communication ½s2; r1] follows a 
path A, as in Table 1. In the other case, the actual path B for 
communication ½s2; r1] is s1 ! M2 ! M3 ! M5 ! r1. a 
Fig. 10. Effect of topology. (a) Impact of the connectivity. (b) Effect of adding different edges. (c) Effect of path selection. 
We observe that the use of mix M3 will slightly increase 
the anonymity in Fig. 10c. This is because mix M3 has more 
input and output links than the other mixes. Communica­
tions that use mix M3 are thus easier to hide. In general, the 
rather minor effect of path selection measured in this 
experiment reflects the fact that the underlying mix net­
work is rather homogeneous, in terms of both symmetry of 
topology and “quality” of the nodes. 
The interested reader may be missing an evaluation that 
measures the effect of the size of the user population at this 
point. As we indicated in the introduction, in this paper, we 
attempt to capture the inherent quality of the anonymity 
network and leave the effect of user population size 
reflected in the per-mix information leakage capacity. 
In practice, in order to better construct an anonymity 
network, first, it is important to have a rich connectivity in 
the network. Second, given similar connectivity in anonym­
ity networks, the topology will affect the “quality” of the 
anonymity network. Finally, the effect of path selection is 
minor when the network is homogeneous in terms of 
symmetry of topology and “quality” of the nodes. 
9 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
Nodes in anonymity networks are inherently heteroge­
neous: platforms can vary. The expertise of their operators 
varies widely as well, and so does the exposure to misuse. 
Similarly, the connectivity of nodes is also not uniform. In 
addition, the types of attacks and their effects on the 
anonymity of the system cannot be predicted. This all 
makes it very difficult for designers of anonymity protocols 
and operators and users of anonymity systems to assess the 
effectiveness of the system. In this paper, we proposed a 
generic information-theoretic measure for the anonymity 
degree. This simple measure ranges between zero and one 
to indicate the overall effectiveness of the mix network as a 
whole. Our work is the first to develop a relationship 
between the anonymity degree and the capacity of 
anonymity-based covert channels. In the mix-network case, 
this relationship is described in a scenario-oriented fashion. 
What is needed is a set of rules to map and cluster arbitrary 
networks into supermixes and clouds. Further research will 
focus on multicast or broadcast channels in the anonymity 
network and their effect on the anonymity degree. Finally, 
we need to extend the work from anonymity-based covert 
channels to general covert channels in mix networks, such 
as the nonanonymity-based covert channels described in 
[13], [21], and [22] or other formalizations of information­
leakage-based attacks. Eventually, a conclusion is needed 
that allows the aggregation attacks and the formulation of 
the level of anonymity provided by systems with less-than­
perfect components. 
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